What Is Going on With Turkey and the Kurds, Anyway?

"If Turkey is Fighting ISIS, and the Kurds are Fighting ISIS, why does Turkey Hate the Kurds?"

To begin to answer this question, it’s important to understand the factions in which we are discussing, and to know that the entire region is a convoluted mess, so this is not meant to be a complete history or an all-encompassing account of the current battlefield dynamics.






Quick overview: 

The Kurds occupy a mostly-autonomous region that crosses the borders of 5 countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia. Throughout these countries, there are vastly-different (and loosely-allied) factions of Kurdish Government and military forces. They are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, and have never had a permanent nation state. The Kurds are primarily Sunni Muslims, but other religions aren’t uncommon in their ranks. Post-WW1, the Treaty of Sevres provided territory for a permanent Kurdish State. This was short-lived; three years later, the Treaty of Lausanne reformed the former Ottoman Empire into what is modern day Turkey, and left the Kurds with minority status and no official nation state.
We will pause there to list Kurdish factions you should know:
PKK: Since 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party, also known as the PKK, has fought the Turkish government in various on-again, off-again conflicts. Kurds make up an estimated 20% of the Turkish population. The PKK was designated a terrorist organization in 2002 by several entities, including NATO, Turkey, the US, and the UK. Turkey has really been going after the PPK -- and by extension, the YPG (next bullet-point) -- since the failed coup in in 2016. The PKK attempted -- mostly unsuccessfully -- to rebrand themselves after ISIS' blitzkrieg through Iraq and Syria; they wanted to create the distinction between fighting Turkey and fighting ISIS. Turkey wasn't really buying it. 
YPG: Formed in 2004 as the military branch of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), the YPG makes up the majority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (the primary opposition to Assad and his Syrian Arab Army [SAA] fighters). Since at least October 2014, the YPG has coordinated with US SOF (special operations forces) to execute terminal-guidance operations, meaning: they’ve helped the bombs from coalition aircraft find the bad guys. Fueled by US-led coalition airstrikes and the Kurds own tactical acumen, vast swaths of territory have been taken from ISIS in a relatively short period of time. The United States (and most other countries) differentiate between the YPG and the PKK, even though they are loosely-allied, while Turkey does not. Kurds in Syria historically haven't had it much better than their brethren in Turkey, facing brutal oppression, mass-killings, and minority status. The PYD/YPG don't necessarily want to create their own Nation State on the border of Syria, but they do say that any conflict resolution must contain provisions for Kurdish autonomy. 

In Iraqi Kurdistan, we have probably the most well-known Kurds: the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). If you haven't heard of them, you've almost certainly heard of their armed forces, the Peshmerga. After the ISIS blitz of Iraq in 2014, the Peshmerga played a huge role (with the help of US-supplied weapons and coalition airpower) in retaking the parts of the country the Iraqi military fled. It was brutal, block-by-block fighting. In 2005, Iraq's new constitution recognized Iraqi Kurdistan as autonomous. In 2017, the KRG declared independence from Iraq, making them the closest -- and most-likely -- of all the Kurds to actually acquire their own Nation State.

Now for Turkey's viewpoint:

The Turkish government completely opposes the Kurds having an independent state, which, until recently, has been the goal of most Kurdish factions. This is still what the Iraqi Kurds (KRG) want, but the stated-goal of the PKK and YPG has changed to wanting something similar to what the Iraqi Kurds enjoy now: they want to be formally recognized as autonomous by their respective countries (Turkey and Syria). Essentially, they claim to just want to rule themselves and be left alone in Greater Kurdistan. Turkey doesn't believe this, and most serious analysts are of the opinion Turkey only joined the battle against ISIS because of the massive success the YPG was having in Syria; Erdogan didn't like the Kurds taking vast swaths of land so close to the Turkish border. Since joining the fight against ISIS, Turkey has expended far more resources targeting the PKK and YPG than it has the Islamic State. For its part in the conflict, Turkey claims to see no official distinction between any of the Kurdish factions (PKK/YPG/Peshmerga) and ISIS. They follow the standard Assad (and Russia) "they're all terrorists" line. While we are publicly supportive of Turkey's fight against the PKK, their aggressive campaigns have caused some friction with the United States when it comes to YPG and the Peshmerga. Unfortunately, this is a diplomatic battle the United States doesn't have much chance of winning; we have to keep Turkey happy in order to continue using Incirlik Air Base, which unfortunately, is one of, if not THE best available base in the region for our anti-ISIS bombing campaign. As long as Turkey doesn't target the YPG positions with American embeds, it's unlikely the United States will do anything more than issue strongly-worded statements of condemnation. This brings us to the current point in the conflict: Trump and Erdogan's agreement.

Brief summary of the agreement: Erdogan wants to cross the border to launch an offensive against the Syrian Kurds in the enclave of Rojava. This isn't the first time they've threatened to do this; just the first time we've refused to push back. Trump capitulated to Erdogan and agreed to withdraw the American forces who effectively act as a shield for the YPG. This is an egregious betrayal of our allies, and serves no tactical purpose, other than to increase the influence of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. By ordering the withdrawal of US troops, Mr. "WE SHOULD HAVE KEPT THE OIL" is also abandoning all the oilfields in eastern Syria and essentially handing them to Russia.

This President has shown time and time again that the word of the United States means absolutely nothing to his administration. The problem is that Trump doesn't understand geopolitics. He doesn't understand cause and effect. He doesn't understand... well, much of any damn thing, honestly; he knows he has to keep the promises he made to his base, consequences be damned, and that's about it. We're not only abandoning our best ally in the region, we're abandoning possibly the only faction in the region that has done away with the extreme-patriarchy that has plagued much of the Middle East. Women aren't second-class citizens in Kurdish society; the YPG preaches gender-equality, and democracy is a critical component of their self-governance. The Kurds are not only the best (read: only) chance for real peace in Syria, they're also the only chance to establish the fledgling democracy we've been trying to push on the region for decades. ISIS is not defeated; prematurely pulling out of Syria and letting our Kurdish allies be slaughtered is going to set the stage for an insurgent resurgence. Trump says Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria can handle what's left of ISIS, and they probably could -- if they were actually making an effort to fight ISIS. Russia is in Syria to prop up Assad and gain a foothold in the region. Assad only cares about clinging to power, so he's happy to -- along with Russia -- be the de facto Air Force for ISIS and continue to slaughter SDF fighters. Erdogan only really cares about looking strong politically and keeping the Kurds from occupying any new space close to the Turkish border. Iran is there to prop up Assad, damage the United States in any way it can, and gain potential footholds for destabilization operations targeted at Israel.

I wasn't kidding when I said this region is a convoluted mess. This barely scratches the surface; I tried to keep it simple while still explaining where the different factions stand. There's a -ton- of fighting going on, but if the US leaves and the Kurds get slaughtered, almost none of it will be directed at ISIS, giving them invaluable time to regroup and reorganize.